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Inferentialism is the view that meaning is constituted, at least in part, by the 
inferential relations that exist between sentences in a language. In his book, aptly 
titled Inferentialism, Jaroslav Peregrin attempts to clearly and concisely restate a 
version of the strong, normative form of inferentialism most convincingly argued 
for in Robert Brandom’s Making It Explicit. At the start, it is important to note the 
clear overlap between Peregrin’s project and Brandom’s in his own Articulating 
Reasons. What separates these projects are, first, Peregrin’s extended focus on 
logical languages, and second, Peregrin’s efforts at bringing new metaphors to bear 
on well-established problems. These new metaphors are Inferentialism’s greatest 
strength, insofar as they promise a deeper understanding of rule-following and 
inferentialism, but also its greatest weakness, insofar as they too often allow 
Peregrin to overlook pressing issues.   
Here, I will outline the major theses of Inferentialism before focusing in 
more detail on Peregrin’s metaphors. Ultimately, Inferentialism is worth reading 
for those already engaged with the inferentialist literature, and can serve as a 
helpful supplement to Brandom’s Articulating Reasons for those coming to 
inferentialism for the first time. 
Structurally, Inferentialism consists of eleven chapters, the first of which 
serves as an introduction. The remaining ten chapters are split evenly into two 
parts, with Part I focusing on familiar Brandomian issues concerning 
representation and the semantics of empirical languages, and Part II focusing on 
less familiar issues concerning logical constants in formal languages.   
Chapters 1 through 3 function together to develop the overall framework of 
inferentialism. Importantly, Peregrin defends strong inferentialism – the claim 
that meaning is constituted solely, and not just in part, by inferential relations – 
and normative inferentialism – the claim that meaning-constituting inferential 
relations are proprieties of proper inference, not (dispositions towards) 
performances of actual inference.   
In Chapter 4, Peregrin focuses on the status of individual rules and their 
role in our linguistic practices, and it is here that he introduces the metaphors I 
will focus on below.   
In Chapter 5, Peregrin’s focus zooms out to consider systems of rules. In 
order to understand how it is that (as he claims) only jointly are rules able to 
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constitute linguistic spaces within which we can engage in language games, 
Peregrin provides a detailed analysis of the Wittgensteinian analogy between 
language and chess, as well as what it tells us about the constitution of Sellars’s 
space of reasons.   
Peregrin concludes Part I with Chapter 6, where he sketches an 
evolutionary account of how rule-following creatures could emerge naturally, and 
propagate themselves and the rules they follow. 
Chapter 7 opens Part II with a discussion of inference and logical 
consequence. As an inferentialist, Peregrin wants to account for consequence in 
terms of inference, but he quickly runs into the objection that consequence 
(understood in terms of truth-preservation) cannot be reduced to inference 
(understood in terms of human proofing) because a proposition can be the 
consequence of an infinite set of premises even though finite humans cannot 
complete an inference with infinite premises. Peregrin argues that this highlights 
a difference merely in degree between consequence and inference, not one in 
kind, and so an inferentialist account can still be illuminating.   
In Chapter 8, Peregrin poses another objection to inferentialism: given how 
Peregrin sets up his inferentialism, no inferential relations can give the sign ‘∨’ the 
meaning of disjunction as conceived in classical logic.   
Peregrin rebuts this objection in Chapter 9, arguing first that the most this 
proves is that intuitionist logic is more natural for the inferentialist, not that the 
inferentialist fails to give ‘∨’ a meaning. If this is not taken as an adequate 
response, Peregrin next argues that, by introducing what he calls multiple-
conclusion inferences, an inferentialist can construct the system of classical logic.  
Both arguments are developed in terms of and in service to Peregrin’s expressivist 
conception of logic.   
Finally, across Chapters 10 and 11 Peregrin argues that the rules of logic are 
constitutive of the space of reasons, and argues that this has two important 
consequences. First, the rules of logic cannot be rationally justified, because any 
rational justification presupposes the rules of logic. Therefore, their only 
justification is pragmatic insofar as they expand the possibilities of cognition and 
help us cope in life. Second, the rules of logic are not rules of reasoning in the 
sense of directing actual processes of reasoning, although they are in the more 
fundamental sense of making possible any reasonings whatsoever. 
Turning now to Peregrin’s metaphors, there are two I would like to 
highlight. Peregrin’s first metaphor, that of bouncing off rules, is meant to shift 
the inferentialist’s discussion away from rule-following. This is warranted because, 
according to Peregrin, linguistic rules are “not prescriptive in the narrow sense of 
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the word in which rules dictate what to do, but rather restrictive; rules tell us 
what not to do, what is prohibited.”1 The image this leaves us with has rules 
functioning as barriers that constrain our linguistic practices. Furthermore, when 
combined appropriately, rules may “delimit some new spaces for our actions” 
precisely “through limiting us in what we may do.”2 To supplement this 
metaphorical language, Peregrin describes how what he says latches onto Wilfrid 
Sellars’s distinctions between rules of doing and rules of criticism, and between 
ought-to-dos and ought-to-bes.3 By cashing out his first metaphor in this manner, 
Peregrin demonstrates the value his metaphors can have in making technical 
inferentialist points considerably more vivid and more intuitive. 
Unfortunately, Peregrin does not always cash out his metaphors in this 
manner, and it is in these cases that his arguments become less enlightening. To 
see why, we need only consider Peregrin’s second metaphor, that of inhabiting a 
linguistic space. Because rules delimit linguistic spaces, we can understand them 
from either an insider’s perspective or an outsider’s perspective. This difference in 
perspectives introduces an issue that strikes at the core of the normative 
inferentialist’s position,4 namely how he is to balance his naturalistic inclinations 
with his desire to acknowledge robust normativity. As Peregrin admits, when we 
describe linguistic spaces from the outside, their normativity seems to dissolve 
into mere dispositions of the sort antithetical to normative inferentialism.  
Peregrin’s response is to prioritize the insider’s perspective, from which the 
normativity of the linguistic space appears genuine. The reason we get to prioritize 
this perspective is, Peregrin claims, because we inhabit linguistic spaces such that 
we have our dwelling within them. Unfortunately, Peregrin never explains what 
this means in non-metaphorical language, and the best his reader is left to make of 
it is that we inhabit certain spaces in the sense that we have normative attitudes 
concerning what is proper within those spaces. 
But if this is all that Peregrin’s metaphor amounts to, it cannot do the work 
he wants it to. Barring some argument, the mere fact that we can inhabit a space 
from within or describe it from without gives us no reason to prioritize one 
perspective over the other. Additionally, the more obvious candidate for 
                                                                
1 Peregrin, Inferentialism, 72 
2 Peregrin, Inferentialism, 73. 
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prioritizing is the outsider’s perspective, if only because the insider’s is more 
limited and parochial. Of course, someone sympathetic to Peregrin would argue 
that this response leads to a regress insofar as the outsider’s perspective must still 
be situated within a linguistic space, and so we must take a meta-outsider’s 
perspective on the outsider’s linguistic space, and so on. But from here the most 
plausible responses are (1) to say that some perspective has proven most useful to 
us, in which case the best candidate would seem to be the sort of philosophically-
informed scientific perspective that would dissolve normativity into dispositions, 
or (2) to accept the regress and argue that this proves the essential finitude of 
humans, in which case we might be unable but to take the insider’s perspective, 
but this merely offers an exculpation of our normative attitudes and not a 
justification. 
All of this is not to say that Peregrin’s position cannot be defended, nor that 
Peregrin’s second metaphor is idle. What it does say is that Peregrin’s metaphor is 
merely the beginning of an account of a naturalistic normative inferentialism, and 
not the full account he takes it to be.   
In conclusion, the merits of Inferentialism – which include Peregrin’s new 
perspective on old problems and extended focus on inferentialism in logic – make 
it worthy of being read by those working in the problem areas surrounding 
inferentialism, and as an introduction to these areas Peregrin’s book is second only 
to Brandom’s Articulating Reasons.5   
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